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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
Utah Code Section 78A-3-102(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah Code Section 
78A-3-102(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to this Court on January 19, 
2011. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant's Brief fails to set forth the appropriate standards of review for each 
issue set forth in his Brief. Each issue set forth by Appellant in his Brief is a question of 
fact. The clearly erroneous standard applies when an appellate court is reviewing 
questions of fact. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). As a result, in order for 
Appellant to prevail, this Court must determine that the findings made by the trial court 
are not adequately supported by the record. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 
P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Wellsville City Ordinance 16.20.040 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal originates from a Petition to Nullify Lien filed by SEAMONS in the 
First District Court on September 23, 2010 in regards to a lien that was filed by 
STEPHEN L. BRANDLEY (hereinafter referred to as "BRANDLEY"), the Appellant, 
and Creekside Land Development, LLC against real property owned by SHERWTN 
SEAMONS and JANE SEAMONS (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"SEAMONS"), the Appellees. BRANDLEY subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss 
SEAMONS5 Petition on September 29, 2010. On October 14, 2010 an evidentiary 
hearing and oral arguments were presented before the First District Court. The District 
Court ultimately concluded that the subject lien was wrongful and void ab initio, and 
further ordered BRANDLEY to pay for SEAMONS attorney's fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 38-9-7. 
BRANDLEY and Creekside Land Development, LLC appealed the District 
Court's ruling. This Court dismissed the appeal of Creekside Land Development, LLC 
and therefore, only BRANDLEY'S appeal remains before this court. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. The parties to this action were involved in a prior litigation resulting from a 
development project in Wellsville, Utah known as Mount Sterling Estates in which the 
parties were business partners. That case was entitled Brandley v. Seamons, Case No. 
070100646, and was filed in the Utah First District Court on or March 19, 2007. 
2. On June 25, 2010, the parties conducted a mediation in which they agreed 
to a resolution of the aforementioned matter. That resolution was memorialized in a 
document executed by both parties and their attorneys entitled 'Mediation Agreement.' 
The Mediation Agreement was drafted by BRANDLEY5 S attorney. (See Mediation 
Agreement attached as Exhibit 'A' to Appellant's Brief). 
3. The dispositive terms of that Mediation Agreement were that SEAMONS 
agreed to pay BRANDLEY a certain sum of money and would agree to convey, by way 
of a quit claim deed, a 35 acre parcel of land that had been designated as open space by 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the City of Wellsville (hereinafter referred to as "PARCEL"), to BRANDLEY. 
BRANDLEY requested to have a 30 day period in which to determine whether or not the 
parcel had already been conveyed by SEAMONS to the City of Wellsville or had 
otherwise been encumbered. If BRANDLEY were to discover within that 30 day period 
that the parcel had been previously conveyed by SEAMONS to the City of Wellsville or 
had otherwise been encumbered, BRANDLEY would be entitled to file a lien in the 
amount of $50,000 against the personal residence of SEAMONS. (See Mediation 
Agreement fflf 2-4) 
4. In the Mediation Agreement, BRANDLEY specifically agreed that the 
open space designation on the parcel would not be considered as an encumbrance for the 
purpose of the agreement as both parties were well aware of such designation at the time 
of the agreement. The Mediation Agreement specifically stated; 
"Creekside Land Development and Stephen Brandley 
acknowledge the 26 acre (sic) parcel is currently designated 
as open space and that such designation does not constitute an 
encumbrance for purposes of this mediation agreement." (See 
Mediation Agreement fflf 3, 4) 
5. On July 9, 2010, counsel for SEAMONS had drafted a Release and 
Settlement Agreement that contained the exact same language concerning the PARCEL 
as those in Mediation Agreement. (See Release and Settlement Agreement ^ 1). 
6. On July 21,2010, BRANDLEY, after having executed the Mediation 
Agreement but having still not signed the Release and Settlement Agreement, attended a 
Wellsville City Council Meeting seeking approval from Wellsville City to develop the 
PARCEL. At that time, Wellsville City declined to approve the development of 
3 
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PARCEL. (See WellsviUe City Council Meeting Minutes Attached as Exhibit 'H' to 
Appellant's Brief). 
7. BRANDLEY informed WellsviUe City at that meeting that PARCEL was 
owned by SEAMONS and that WellsviUe City "should move on it," and requested that 
WellsviUe City discuss the matter with its City Attorney and stated that "some sort of 
filing should be done on the property." Id. 
8. Finally, on July 26,2010 five days after BRANDLEY had approached the 
WellsviUe City Council and seventeen days after BRANDLEY had received the Release 
and Settlement Agreement, BRANDLEY executed the Settlement Agreement with 
knowledge that WellsviUe City was going to file a Notice of Subdivision Ordinance 
Violation against PARCEL. 
9. On July 30,2010, the City of WellsviUe filed a Notice of Subdivision 
Ordinance Violation Re: Open Space Ownership Requirements in the Mount Sterling 
Estates Subdivision against PARCEL alleging a violation of WellsviUe City Ordinance 
16.20.040. (See Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation) 
10. WellsviUe City Ordinance 16.20.040 is entitled "Open Space" and requires 
applicants for development of land within the city to set-aside sensitive lands or 
potentially sensitive lands as "open space." The ordinance also dictates the percentage of 
land that must be set-aside, the maintenance of "open space" and the ownership standards 
of the "open space," which requires that such lands should be owned, administered or 
maintained by the City of WellsviUe, and Homeowners' Association or a Private 
Conservation Organization. (See WellsviUe City Ordinance Attached as Exhibit 'D' to 
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Appellant's Brief). 
11. BRANDLEY knew or had reason to know at the time of the execution of 
the MEDIATION AGREEMENT and SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT that PARCEL was 
designated as "open space" and knew or had reason to know of Wellsville City Ordinance 
16.20.040 that governed properties designated as "open space". For this reason, 
BRANDLEY had approached the Wellsville City Council to inquire about development 
ofthePARCEL. 
12. BRANDLEY himself was in charge of the approval process for this Mount 
Sterling Estates project. His duties required him to meet with officials from the City of 
Wellsville, including the City Manager and Engineer, in regards to the development and 
the open space designation, and the restrictions that accompanied such a designation. (R. 
at 12:5) 
13. Also, during the mediation, BRANDLEY and SEAMONS discussed the 
effects that Wellsville City Ordinance 16.20.040 would have on PARCEL. 
14. In support of the filing of the subject lien, BRANDLEY asserted that 
PARCEL had been encumbered in that PARCEL had a judgment against it in the amount 
of $25,841.91 in favor of Creative Window Design (hereinafter referred to as 
"JUDGMENT"), and that PARCEL had further been encumbered by the Ordinance 
Violation. (R. at 44:13-22). 
15. As support for their assertion that PARCEL had been encumbered, 
BRANDLEY produced a title insurance report that had been performed by 
BRANDLEY5 S brother, Mike Brandley on June 28, 2010. 
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16. Because the title report prepared by BRANDLEY'S brother was prepared 
on June 28, 2010, nearly one month prior to BRANDLEY executing the Settlement 
Agreement, BRANDLEY at the time he executed that Agreement, had knowledge of the 
JUDGMENT as well as knowledge of the fact that Wellsville City was going to file a 
Notice of Ordinance Violation. 
17. The JUDGMENT identified in the title report prepared by BRANDLEY'S 
brother, however, had been satisfied six years prior, on or about August 16, 2004 and a 
Release of Notice of Lien and Satisfaction of Judgment in that regard had been filed with 
the Cache County Recorder's Office on or about August 16, 2004. This fact, however, 
was not identified in the title report prepared by BRANDLEY'S brother. (See Release of 
Notice of Lien and Satisfaction of Judgment). 
18. Both parties stipulated, before the trial court, that the title report was in 
error and that there was no valid encumbrance because of the JUDGMENT. (R. at 48:24 
-49:2). 
19. On or about August 26, 2010, SEAMONS requested in a writing to counsel 
for BRANDLEY that the subject lien be released. BRANDLEY refused to release the 
lien. (See Letter from Counsel for SEAMONS). 
20. As a result, SEAMONS filed a Petition to Nullify Lien with the First 
District Court seeking an order from the Court that the lien was wrongful and void ab 
initio. 
21. After an evidentiary hearing and oral arguments, the trial court found that 
the lien was wrongful and void ab intito and ordered BRANDLEY to pay SEAMONS' 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
costs and attorney's fees. (See Trial Court's Order Granting Petitioner's Petition ^ 7). 
22. An Order Granting Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Lien and Denying 
Respondants' Motion to Dismiss was drafted by counsel for SEAMONS and was 
approved as to form and content by BRANDLEY without objections. (See Trial Court's 
Order). 
/// 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
BRANDLEY'S Brief improperly introduces evidence that was not presented to the 
trial court and was not part of the record. Because this Court will not consider new 
evidence, it must disregard and strike BRANDLEY'S Brief. In addition, BRANDLEY'S 
Brief fails to comply to requirements set forth in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, in that he fails to provide a citation to the record showing his issues were 
preserved in the trial court and/or failed to provide a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of his issues. 
BRANDLEY'S Brief should also be disregarded and/or stricken on the grounds 
that it is full of burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial and/or scandalous matters not only 
due to the new evidence and issues raised, but also due to inaccurate and misleading 
citations to the record and frivolous accusations of fraud against Appellants that were 
never raised in the trial court. 
Should this Court see fit to entertain BRANDLEY'S contentions, it will find that 
the District Court was correct in its determination that the lien filed by BRANDLEY was 
wrongful at the time it was filed. The District Court correctly determined that the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agreement between the parties required that in order for BRANDLEY to file the subject 
lien, the PARCEL had to have been conveyed to the City of Wellsville at the time the lien 
was filed and/or there had to be some encumbrance other than the open space designation 
discovered against said PARCEL. The trial court correctly determined that PARCEL had 
not been conveyed to the City of Wellsville at the time the lien was filed and that no 
evidence had been presented to support a contention that the PARCEL had been 
conveyed to the City of Wellsville. 
Further, the District Court correctly determined that there was no evidence of any 
other encumbrances against the PARCEL at the time the lien was filed. Because the 
parties stipulated the title report was in error and that the JUDGMENT did not constitute 
and encumbrance and because the Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation filed by the 
City of Wellsville was determined not be an encumbrance, the District Court's findings 
were correct and this Court must affirm the final judgment of the District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BRANDLEY'S BRIEF IS IMPROPER AS IT PRESENTS NEW 
EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
BRANDLEY, in his brief, cites to several items of evidence that were not before 
the trial court and are not part of the record. Rule 11(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure sets forth the composition of the record on appeal as follows: 
"The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, 
including the presentence report in criminal matters, the 
transcript of the proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the 
clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute 
the record on appeal in all cases." 
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It has long been the policy of the Appellate Court that it will not consider new evidence 
on appeal. See In re L.M., 2001 UT App. 314, f^ 16 n.3, 37 P.3d 1188. As a result 
thereof, SEAMONS objects to the following evidence, and any reference thereto, 
identified in BRANDLEY' s Brief: 
1) Exhibit F, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as; "4th District 
Court - Provo Utah County, State of Utah." 
2) Exhibit K, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as; 
"Development Agreement." 
3) Exhibit L, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as; "Plat." 
4) Exhibit N, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as; 
"Disolutionment" (sic). 
5) Exhibit O, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as; 
"Incorporation doc." (sic). 
6) Exhibit P, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as "Transfer of 
asset desolved (sic.) company by Seamons." 
7) Exhibit Q, as attached to BRANDLEY's Brief, identified as "New 
company same name by Seamons." 
8) Any and all references to the Judgment cited in the title report prepared 
by Bonneville Title as being a "typing error." There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the Judgment, or the amount thereof, was a mere 
typing error and BRANDLEY did not produce any evidence that was 
the case. 
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9) Any and all references to an "outstanding" judgment in the Fourth 
District Court. There is nothing in the record to indicate that any 
evidence was presented of an outstanding judgment in the Fourth 
District Court. 
10)Any and all references to "tax liens." There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that this issue was brought before the trial court. BRANDLEY 
made no attempt to enter any evidence of any "tax liens" into evidence. 
1 l)Any reference to an alleged contract between SEAMONS and the City 
of Wellsville as there is no mention in the record of any such contract 
between SEAMONS and the City of Wellsville. 
12) Any reference to any dissolution of any company by SEAMONS. 
Again, there is nothing on the record to indicate that any such evidence 
was brought before the trial court. 
13)Any reference to a "new company" owned by SEAMONS, and any 
transfers of property to this "new company." There is no mention of 
any "new company" anywhere in the record. 
14)Any reference to Bonneville Superior Title Company as an "expert in 
the field of property records." There was no evidence presented to the 
trial court that Bonneville Title is an expert in the field of property 
records, and this Court should not consider such reference. 
BRANDLEY fails to give any citation to the record where this evidence was ever 
presented to the trial court. It is improper for BRANDLEY to now include this new 
10 
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evidence in his Brief. It would be prejudicial for this Court to consider this new evidence 
as SEAMONS can only address it by presenting new evidence of their own, which they 
cannot do. If this Court were to consider this newly presented evidence, it would be 
impossible to accurately determine if the trial court's determination, based on the 
evidence presented to it, was correct. Therefore, SEAMONS does hereby ask that this 
Court find BRANDLEY's Brief to be improper and to exclude the above-referenced 
evidence from its consideration. 
II. BRANDLEY'S BRIEF SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AND/OR 
STRICKEN AS IT CONTAINS MATTERS THAT ARE INACCURATE, 
BURDENSOME. IRRELEVANT. IMMATERIAL AND SCANDALOUS. 
BRANDLEY's Brief is completely improper in form and in content and should be 
disregarded and/or stricken. Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
"All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous 
matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, 
and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer" 
BRANDLEY's Brief is in violation of this rule in several aspects. While SEAMONS 
understand that BRANDLEY may deserve some latitude as he has appeared pro se, 
however his entire brief is improper as it presents new evidence, fails to provide citations 
to the record wherein his issues were preserved for appeal, fails to state the proper 
standard for review, raises issues that were never before the trial court, inaccurately cites 
the record, and raises issues that are immaterial, irrelevant, burdensome and scandalous. 
l l 
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BRANDLEY has raised several issues that are confusing, irrelevant and lack 
support in both law and fact, including accusations that the trial court judge somehow 
acted improperly by participating as a witness in the case. These issues are so outlandish 
that they are difficult for SEAMONS to even address. BRANDLEY'S Brief also makes 
allegations of fraud against SEAMONS. (See BRANDLEY's Brief page 27). These 
allegations are immaterial and scandalous as there is no evidence to support such an 
assertion, and no such claims were ever made before the trial court. BRANDLEY cannot 
now raise these issues for the first time on appeal. 
BRANDLEY also asks that this Court award him $25,000 to cover "costs of 
attorneys on original hearing (sic.) and subsequent filings" as well as punitive damages 
for "malice of forethought (sic.) and Fraud in the inducement to settle." (See 
BRANDLEY's Brief page 29). There was no evidence to support these allegations and 
to do so now, without SEAMONS having the ability to respond thereto because they 
cannot present new evidence, is improper. 
Finally, BRANDLEY5 S Brief is inaccurate. BRANDLEY makes 
misrepresentations and mischaracterizations of the record and the findings made by the 
trial court. (See BRANDLEY's Brief page 20 and R. at 48-49). Many of 
BRANDLEY'S assertions and allegations are false, disingenuous and intellectually 
dishonest and detract the Court's attention from the only issues that could be brought 
1 before it. Making it difficult for SEAMONS to properly address BRANDLEY'S Brief. 
Because BRANDLEY's Brief is inaccurate, improper, immaterial and scandalous, it 
should be stricken by this Court. 
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III. BRANDLEY FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED IN HIS BRIEF FOR APPEAL. 
BRANDLEY raises several issues that were not presented to the trial court. It is 
settled law that the Court of Appeals will not address arguments made for the first time 
on appeal. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n. 2 (Utah App.1990), cert, denied, 860 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). None of the issues set forth by BRANDLEY in his brief were 
preserved for appeal as they were not presented to the trial court. BRANDLEY failed to 
provide a citation to the record showing that the issues were preserved in the trial court or 
to provide a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court as required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In order to preserve an issue, the issue must be raised before the trial court in a 
timely fashion, must be specifically raised, and must be supported by the party through 
evidence or legal authority. See O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, Tf 18, 217 P.3d 704. [I]n 
order to preserve an issue for appeal[, ] the issue must be presented to the trial court in 
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. This requirement 
puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at that time in 
the course of the proceeding. 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, \ 51, 99 P.3d 
801. f,[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, 
unless an appellant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances1 exist or 'plain error1 
occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346. 
Because BRANDLEY failed to present any of these issues on appeal, the trial 
court never had an opportunity to rule on them. This is evident from his failure to make 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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any citation to the record wherein these issues were preserved for appeal. In fact, counsel 
for BRANDLEY approved to the trial court's findings and orders without objection. The 
trial court's findings consisted of the following: 
1) The Mediation Agreement was drafted by BRANDLEY's counsel and should 
be interpreted against his interest. 
2) The title report prepared by Bonneville Superior Title was in error. 
3) The judgment identified in the title report prepared by Bonneville Superior 
Title was not an encumbrance to the open space parcel. 
4) The open space parcel had not been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. 
5) SEAMONS had conveyed the open space parcel to BRANDLEY by way of a 
quit claim deed and therefore released only the property interest possessed by 
SEAMONS at the time of the conveyance. 
6) The lien in the amount of $50?000 that was filed by BRANDLEY against the 
residence owned by SEAMONS was wrongful and void ab initio. (See Trial 
Court's Order). 
The trial court further ordered that the subject lien be released. There was never any 
objection made by BRANDLEY in regards to these findings and BRANDLEY failed to 
specifically raise these issues before the trial court in a timely fashion. Even if the Court 
were to somehow find that BRANDLEY specifically raised these issues, he failed to 
support them through evidence or legal authority. 
Further, BRANDLEY in his brief does not set forth any facts to support a 
contention that exceptional circumstances or plain error occurred. As a result, 
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SEAMONS contends that these issues should not be entertained by this Court for the 
following reasons: 
a. BRANDLEY's"AIssue." 
BRANDLEY's first issue raised is in regards to the introduction of the quit claim 
deed. There were plenty of opportunities for BRANDLEY to object to the introduction 
of the quit claim deed, as it was mentioned in the papers prepared by both parties and 
discussed openly in the evidentiary hearing. (See Petition to Nullify Lien and 
Respondants' Motion to Dismiss, R. at 30:2-22). Further, it was a vital part of the 
agreements between the parties that gave rise to his action. There is no indication from 
the record that its authenticity was ever in question. As a result, this issue was not 
preserved for appeal and should not be considered by this Court. 
b. BRANDLEY's "B Issue" 
BRANDLEY's second issue raised in his brief is somewhat confusing, but appears 
to involve what he believes to have been a prior conveyance of the PARCEL by 
SEAMONS to the City of Wellsville and/or an assertion that the PARCEL had been 
encumbered. While these arguments may have been presented to the trial court, they were 
still not preserved on appeal. BRANDLEY approved, without objection, the findings in 
the Court's Order which indicated that the judgment originally identified by 
BRANDLEY as an encumbrance was, in fact, not an encumbrance and that the open 
space parcel had not been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. (See Trial Court's Order fflf 
3,4). BRANDLEY stated no objections to these findings, in fact he agreed to the form 
and content of the Order. As a result, this Court should not consider this issue. 
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c. BRANDLEY's "C Issue" 
BRANDLEY also failed to raise, in the trial court, what he has labeled as "C 
ISSUE" in his Appellate Brief. This issue, although vague, involves the trial court 
judge's alleged role as a witness in the case. Again, this issue was never presented to the 
trial court. BRANDLEY again asserts that by mentioning the quit claim deed, the judge 
entered new evidence and became a witness. As stated above, BRANDLEY stated no 
objection to the entry of the quit claim deed. The trial court merely explained the legal 
definition and effect of a quit claim deed. Legal theories or definitions are not evidence 
and thus this issue should not be heard on appeal. 
d. BRANDLEY's "D Issue" 
BRANDLEY also failed to preserve the issue that he labeled "D ISSUE" in his 
Appellate Brief. That issue deals with the propriety of a statement made by the trial court 
judge in which he indicated that he found the agreements between the parties to be 
"somewhat ambiguous." There was no objection made by BRANDLEY to this 
statement. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court was presented 
with this issue and given the opportunity to address it, as a result, this court cannot hear 
this issue on appeal. 
e. BRANDLEY's "E Issue55 
BRANDLEY certainly did not preserve what he labels UE Issue" for appeal. 
BRANDLEY states this issue as; "Weather (sic.) the decision as to the status of the 
judgment shown on the title work from Bonneville Title was correct." BRANDLEY 
hasn't indicated where in the record he preserved this issue for appeal. What 
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BRANDLEY does do is inaccurately cite the record. BRANDLEY asserts in his brief 
that "The Judge in his decision acknowledged that Appelant (sic.) did not stipulate to it 
the [Judgment] as being satisfied." (See BRANDLEY's Brief page 20). An accurate 
citation of the record clearly shows that the parties stipulated to the fact that the title 
report was in error. (R. at 48-49). In addition, as stated above, the BRANDLEY 
approved, without objection to the trial court's Order, wherein the court found that the 
title report was in error. (See Trial Court's Order f 3). There was never any objection 
made to whether the title work was in error, BRANDLEY stipulated to it. He cannot now 
raise this issue on appeal. As a result, this Court should not consider this issue as 
presented by BRANDLEY. 
f. BRANDLEY's "F Issue55 
This Court should also refuse to consider this issue, as BRANDLEY failed to 
properly preserve it in the trial court. BRANDLEY's "F Issue" is whether the trial judge 
was erred in finding that the MEDIATION AGREEMENT was drafted by 
BRANDLEY's counsel and therefore should be interpreted in a manner against his 
interest. Again, the Court, in its findings, stated that it found the Mediation Agreement to 
have been drafted by BRANDLEY's counsel. (R. at 47:15-18). BRANDLEY's counsel 
approved that finding as to form and content before it was ever presented to the Court. 
(See Trial Court's Order 11). 
Further, the only evidence BRANDLEY cites to in support of his issue is language 
from the Settlement Agreement which applies only to the Settlement Agreement as it was 
executed several weeks after the Mediation Agreement. (See Appellant's Brief page 22). 
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As a result, BRANDLEY failed to preserve this issue for appeal and this Court should 
disregard this issue as set forth by BRANDLEY. 
g. BRANDLEY's "G Issue" 
BRANDLEY also failed to preserve his issue, identified as "G Issue" for appeal. 
This issue merely objects to a statement made by the trial court judge. There were no 
facts or legal arguments or objections presented to the trial court that could have 
preserved this issue for appeal. BRANDLEY's "issue" merely states that he disagrees 
with the trial court judge's statement. This isn't an appealable issue and the Court should 
disregard this issue as presented by BRANDLEY. 
h. BRANDLEY's "H Issue" 
BRANDLEY's final issue should also be disregarded by this Court. This issue as 
set forth by BRANDLEY, states; "Weather (sic.) Seamons have (sic.) a contractual 
agreement with the city and did it constitute an encumbrance." BRANDLEY again failed 
to cite to any place in the record where this issue was preserved for appeal. There was 
never any evidence presented to the trial court of a contract between SEAMONS and the 
City of Wellsville. As a result, the trial court never had an opportunity to rule on this 
issue. 
BRANDLEY's argument before the trial court was that a Wellsville City 
Ordinance restricted SEAMONS' ability to convey the parcel to BRANDLEY. (R. at 
42:25-44:2). BRANDLEY never argued that SEAMONS had a contract with the City of 
Wellsville, nor did he present any evidence to that effect. As a result, this is the first time 
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this issue has ever been raised by BRANDLEY. Because this issue is now raised for the 
first time it must be disregarded by this Court. 
IV. THE ONLY ISSUE THAT COULD BE HEARD BY THIS COURT WAS 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE LIEN 
FILED BY BRANDLEY TO BE WRONGFUL. 
SEAMONS originally appeared before the trial court on a Petition to Nullify Lien 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7(1). As set forth in the rule, "[a] summary 
proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a document is a 
wrongful lien." See Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4). In such a proceeding, the trial court 
may not determine any other property or legal rights of the parties, nor can the court 
restrict other legal remedies of the parties. Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., LLQ 2005 UT 59, 
f 14, 123P.3d393. 
The trial court in this matter could only make a determination of whether the lien 
in question was indeed wrongful. As a result, the only issue that can be before this Court 
on appeal is whether the trial court's determination that the lien was wrongful was 
correct. BRANDLEY has not specifically identified this as an issue, and has failed to set 
forth the proper standard for review thereof. While SEAMONS contends that this Court 
should disregard and strike BRANDLEY5 s Brief completely, if this Court does entertain 
BRANDLEY5 s appeal it should only review this issue as it was the only issue before the 
trial court. 
Whether a lien is wrongful as defined in Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1 is a 
question of law that is to be reviewed for correctness. Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT 
App. 243, If 21, 166 P.3d 639. "Correctness55 means the appellate court decides the 
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matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). This Court can only consider legal grounds 
and theories that are apparent on the record. Dipama v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, \ 18. 29 
P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb, 23 Utah 2d at 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d at 293 n. 2). Therefore, 
this Court cannot consider the new legal theories and/or evidence now presented by 
BRANDLEY when reviewing the trial court's judgment in this regard. If this Court does 
see fit to review the determinations of the trial court it must restrict its review to the issue 
of the correctness of the trial court's determination that the lien filed by BRANDLEY 
was wrongful. 
V. THE LIEN FILED BY BRANDLEY WAS WRONGFUL AT THE TIME 
IT WAS FILED. 
As set forth herein, the only issue before the trial court was whether the subject 
lien was wrongful. Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 defines a wrongful lien as follows: 
"[A]ny document that purports to create a lien, notice of 
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property and at the time it is recorded is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property. 
BRANDLEY made no attempt in the trial court to argue that subsection (a) or (b) 
authorized the filing of the lien against the real property owned by SEAMONS. The only 
issue before the trial court was whether or not the Mediation and/or Settlement 
Agreement authorized the BRANDLEY to file the lien. The trial court correctly 
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determined that neither of these agreements authorized BRANDLEY to file the subject 
lien. 
Because the appropriate standard of review for such an issue is one of correctness, 
this court may decide the matter for itself without deference to the trial judge's 
determination of the law. State v. Pena (Utah 1994) 869 P.2d 932, 936. Because this 
Court will not consider new evidence, it can only utilize the evidence presented in the 
trial court record when applying the law. 
The relevant agreements contained the following relevant provision: 
"The quit claim deed will be held at the office of Hillyard, 
Anderson & Olsen, P.C. for a period not to exceed thirty days 
from the date it was signed. Creekside Land Development 
will have a thirty (30) day period to conduct due diligence 
concerning the 26 acre parcel to determine if it has been 
conveyed to the City of Wellsville or otherwise encumbered. 
If it is determined the 26 acre parcel has not been conveyed to 
the City of Wellsville or otherwise encumbered Creekside 
Land Development must file the deed within 30 days of the 
date the quit claim deed was signed. Creekside Land 
Development and Stephen Brandley acknowledge the 26 acre 
parcel is currently designated as open space and that such a 
designation does not constitute and (sic.) encumbrance for 
purposes of this mediation agreement. 
In the event Creekside Land Development discovers, within 
the thirty (30) day period, the 26 acre parcel has been 
conveyed to the City of Wellsville or otherwise encumbered 
then Creekside Land Development and Stephen Brandley 
shall be entitled to file a lien against the residence of Sherwin 
and Jane Seamons located at 190 South 300 West, Mendon, 
UT in the amount of $50,000" 
By the very terms of the MEDIATION AGREEMENT, BRANDLEY was only able to 
file the subject lien upon a showing of the occurrence of one of two events; (1) that the 
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parcel in question had been conveyed to the City of Wellsville, or (2) that the parcel had 
otherwise been encumbered. BRANDLEY, however, had agreed that the open space 
designation would not constitute an encumbrance. BRANDLEY produced no evidence to 
the trial court that either of these two events entitling him to file the lien ever occurred. 
a. Conveyance to City of Wellsville. 
BRANDLEY makes an attempt in his brief to assert that the PARCEL had been 
conveyed to the City of Wellsville. The trial court found that the PARCEL had not been 
conveyed to the City of Wellsville. There was no evidence presented to the trial court 
that PARCEL had ever been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. (See R. at 48:9-21). 
There was evidence presented to the trial court, and attached to BRANDLEY's 
brief as Exhibit R, of a Notice of Interest that was filed by the BRANDLEY himself on 
the property. (See R. at 22:1-23:7). It is evident that had BRANDLEY truly believed 
that the PARCEL had been conveyed, or was required to be conveyed by contract, to the 
City of Wellsville by the owner of the parcel, he would not have filed the Notice of 
Interest on the property. 
BRANDLEY, in his testimony before the trial court, explained to the trial court 
that he was a partner with SEAMONS in a development project from which PARCEL 
arose. (R. at 11:20-12:5). BRANDLEY stated that he managed the approval process for 
this particular development project and that he had met several times with officials from 
the City of Wellsville in regards to the development and the open space designation, and 
the restrictions that accompanied such a designation. (R. at 12:5). Further, BRANDLEY 
recognized the open space designation in the Mediation and Settlement Agreements. 
22 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nevertheless, BRANDLEY approached the trial court and now approaches this court 
posturing as if he was unaware of the restrictions that accompanied the open space 
restriction. 
BRANDLEY raises issues revolving around the open space designation and 
development agreement as though he was unaware of them prior to entering into the 
Mediation Agreement. The evidence presented before the trial court, however, clearly 
indicates that BRANDLEY had an understanding of the open space designation and its 
restrictions and therefore cannot in good faith claim that he didn't know the status of the 
PARCEL that he agreed to accept by way of quit claim deed as part of the Mediation 
Agreement. 
There was also evidence of a Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation that was 
filed by the City of Wellsville and presented to the trial court. (R. at 35:11-37:25). That 
Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation was filed and recorded by the City of 
Wellsville with the Cache County Recorder on July 30, 2010, just three days after 
BRANDLEY had signed the Settlement Agreement and nine days after BRANDLEY had 
approached the Wellsville City Council asking for approval to develop on the PARCEL. 
The Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation makes clear that the PARCEL had not 
previously been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. The mere fact that the City of 
Wellsville felt it necessary to make such a filing is evidence that they were aware that 
title to the PARCEL had never been conveyed to them. 
The very first paragraph of that document states: "Sherwin K. Seamons and Jane 
C. Seamons, husband and wife, are the owners of the following described real property." 
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It is obvious that the City of Wellsville, at that time, recognized SEAMONS as the owner 
of PARCEL. The entire tone of the Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation is to 
provide notice to any potential purchasers or transferees of the ordinance violation. The 
Notice was filed for the sole purpose of advising any potential purchaser and/or 
transferees of the open space designation and the Wellsville City open space ordinance, 
which was attached to the recorded Notice. 
The Notice, in paragraph 6, states that the City of Wellsville has "contractual 
rights to require that title to said Open Space be transferred." The Notice of Subdivision 
Ordinance merely states that the City has the right to require transfer of the open space. 
The Notice of Subdivision Ordinance, in and of itself, is sufficient evidence to show that 
SEAMONS had not conveyed the open space parcel to the City of Wellsville at the time 
BRANDLEY filed his lien. The Court correctly determined that there was no evidence, 
law or statute presented to it that indicated that the PARCEL had been conveyed to the 
City of Wellsville. (Rat 48:12-16). The Mediation Agreement only allowed 
BRANDLEY to file a lien if the PARCEL had already been conveyed to the City of 
Wellsville. 
In addition, the abstract of title for PARCEL demonstrated that PARCEL had 
never been conveyed by SEAMONS to the City of Wellsville. (See Exhibit G to 
Appellant's Brief). There were no facts produced by BRANDLEY in the trial court that 
would have led the trial court to find that PARCEL had been conveyed to the City of 
Wellsville at the time BRANDLEY filed his lien. Therefore, the trial court correctly 
determined that the PARCEL had not been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. 
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b. Encumbrances 
Because the evidence demonstrates that the open space was not conveyed to the 
City of Wellsville, BRANDLEY must demonstrate that the open space was otherwise 
encumbered. Both the Mediation Agreement and Settlement Agreement expressly state 
that the open space designation would not be considered an encumbrance. BRANDLEY 
argued to the trial court that the Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation and the 
JUDGMENT were both encumbrances on the open space parcel at the time the 
BRANDLEY'S lien was filed. The trial court correctly determined that neither of these 
encumbered the open space parcel at the time of the lien filing. 
1. Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation 
The trial court correctly determined that the Notice of Subdivision Ordinance 
Violation that was filed by the City of Wellsville on July 30, 2010 was not an 
encumbrance. The Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation was filed by the City of 
Wellsville to advise potential purchasers and transferees that the Wellsville City open 
space ordinance would be binding on the current owners and upon all successors in 
interest. The Notice was to advise any and all potential successors in interest of the open 
space designation, a designation of which BRANDLEY was already aware. 
BRANDLEY openly admitted that he was aware of the open space designation long 
before the parties entered into the Mediation Agreement. (R. at 9:10-11). BRANDLEY 
agreed at the mediation that such an open space designation would not constitute an 
encumbrance. To allow BRANDLEY the ability to now claim that the Notice of 
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< 
Subdivision Ordinance Violation was an encumbrance would be to allow him to 
circumvent the terms that he agreed to in the Mediation Agreement. 
SEAMONS did not make any misrepresentation to BRANDLEY as to the status of 
the open space. SEAMONS willingly disclosed the very facts that were disclosed by 
Wellsville City in the Notice of the Subdivision Ordinance Violation. Evidence was 
presented to the trial court that BRANDLEY knew or should have known about the open 
space restrictions. BRANDLEY admitted to the trial court that he was privy to the 
writing up of the plat for the original development from which PARCEL was originally 
designated as open space. (R. at 9:19-20). BRANDLEY further stated that it was his 
personal responsibility to get the development approved and that he was the manager of 
the approval process, and as such his duties entailed meeting with the City of Wellsville, 
going to meetings with the Utah Department of Transportation, meeting with the city 
planner, the city engineer and the city council. (R. at 12:1-23). It is disingenuous for 
BRANDLEY to now claim that he was not aware of the ramifications of the open space 
designation. 
Even if BRANDLEY did not have notice of the ordinance violation, Utah law 
charged him with notice of the ordinance violation. "Purchasers of land must take notice 
of public statutes restricting the use of the granted premises and such restrictions 
constitute no breach of covenant or warranty." Flemetis v. McArthur 226 P.2d 124, 126, 
119 Utah 268 (Utah 1951) (Citing Maupin on Marketable Title, 3rd Ed., Sec. 143). In 
Arnellv. Salt Lake County Bd. Of Adjustment, 112 P.3d 1214 (Utah App. 2005), this 
Court was presented with a similar scenario in which a purchaser of land had been 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conveyed real property by warranty deed, which included a warranty against 
encumbrances. See Arnell at 1217. Neither the seller nor the purchaser had investigated 
any ordinances that might restrict the use of the real property. Id. at 1218. Subsequent to 
the conveyance, the purchaser discovered a slope ordinance that prohibited him from 
developing on the parcel. Id. As a result, the purchaser sought rescission of the purchase 
contract. Id. at 1219. This court approvingly cited to Flemitis charging the purchaser 
with taking notice of public statutes restricting use. Id. at 1227. And went on to hold 
that; "[the purchaser] is charged with knowledge of the Slope Ordinance, a public statute, 
and such statutes constitute no breach of the covenant against encumbrances." Id. 
BRANDLEY may argue that even though the parcel was conveyed by way of a 
quit claim deed, that SEAMONS made certain warranties by indicating that if 
BRANDLEY were to determine that PARCEL was encumbered, that he could file the 
subject lien. However, the law set forth in Arnell indicates that public statutes do not 
constitute a covenant against encumbrances and that BRANDLEY should have made 
himself aware of the open space ordinance before entering into the Mediation Agreement. 
The fact that BRANDLEY had been aware of the open space ordinance for quite some 
time, lends strength to the argument that he should have been charged with notice and 
that the ordinance should not be considered an encumbrance pursuant to the Mediation 
and Settlement Agreements. As a result, the trial correct correctly determined that the 
Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation was not an encumbrance at the time 
BRANDLEY filed his lien. 
/// 
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2. The Judgment 
In addition to the Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation, BRANDLEY's 
second stated basis for filing the subject lien was the JUDGMENT that BRANDLEY 
contended encumbered the open space parcel. (See Petition To Nullify Lien Exhibit' J'). 
In support of this contention, BRANDLEY produced a title report that was 
prepared by Bonneville Superior Title Company on or about June 28, 2010. To prepare 
the title report, BRANDLEY sought the services of his brother, Mike Brandley, who was 
the lead title searcher at Bonneville Title at that time. (R. at 18:6-8). Mike Brandley's 
name appears as the 'Escrow Officer' on the title report. The trial court found that the 
title report was in error in identifying that the Judgment amount was $25,841.91 after 
evidence presented in the form of the docket from a Release of Notice of Lien and 
Satisfaction of Judgment that was filed with the Cache County Recorder's Office signed 
by Creative Window Design and Christopher Sutherland. (See Trial Court Order ^ 2). 
That Release of Notice of Lien identified the same case name, case number and entry 
number as the Judgment on the title report, however it identified the judgment amount as 
$2,133.49. BRANDLEY even stipulated before the trial court that the title report was in 
error and that it was not an encumbrance on PARCEL (R. at 48:22 - 49:2). BRANDLEY 
did not produce any evidence that JUDGMENT existed or had not been released by the 
judgment holder. Based on this evidence, the trial court determined that the title report 
was in error, and that this alleged encumbrance was nonexistent at the time BRANDLEY 
filed the subject lien. Id. 
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B R A N D L E Y now seeks to assert that this was a mere typing error and as a result, 
this court should determine that this judgment was an encumbrance on the PARCEL. 
typing erroi. 1 hcic was no testimony from Mike Brandley or anyone else at Bonnevi l le 
Title to indicate that this was a typing error as B R A N D L E Y contends. Even i f this court 
were to assume that I I K A M *I M is correct and tllis was a mere typing error, S E A M O N S 
should * ' •- • -nil-*- i! conseqi lence of tl mt 1> ph lg ei i oi BR AN DI E Y • A» 0 1 ild like 
this court to hold S E A M O N S responsible for the errors committed by his brother and/or 
Bonnevi l le Title. Equity does not al low for this court to grant such a request by 
BR A N D L K Y Bcemr^e Ihciv was no t /v idr iuv produced l»> support a conlculn1 mi Mmi I|H 
title report contained only a "typing error" and because the parties stipulated that the title 
report was in error and that the J U D G M E N T had been satisfied, the trial coiu t 's 
t lclerminalion llml tin* IIII X I M L N T wns uul ;m cnciiinhiiiiice was correct. 
3. Other Encumbrances 
B R A N D L E Y , in his brief, also asserts that there are other encumbrances in 
additioi I to the Not ice of Si lbdrv isioi i Ordinance Violation and e-.- Judgment identified in 
the title report. B R A N D L E Y specifically identifies "to ix l iens" for nominal amoi ints that 
also appeared on the title report prepared by Bonnevi l le Title. (See page Appellant's 
Brief page _•() i B R A N D I E Y n o w attempts to argue that the alleged " tax l i ens" 
(in u m l v r e d fin: open ^p;ice p i u w l -'I HK Iii>Ii• the lien "i\< tiled p. improper . 
B R A N D L E Y has never made any indication that he bel ieved that the parcel was 
encumbered by tax liens until the time that he filed his Appellate Brief. While the title 
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I 
report was submitted to the trial court, the issue in regards to the tax liens were never 
submitted and therefore never directly addressed by SEAMONS. These tax liens were 
not determined to be an encumbrance by either party prior to the appeal. As 
BRANDLEY is well aware, had the issue been raised in the trial court, SEAMONS 
would have produced evidence to address the issue. 
If this Court does see it fit to address the issue of tax liens, the matter has already 
been indirectly addressed. BRANDLEY has attached an uncertified copy of the abstract 
of title for the PARCEL to his Brief as Exhibit 'G \ Glaringly absent from that abstract 
of title are any of these alleged tax liens as identified in the title report prepared by 
Bonneville Title. Therefore, the only evidence of any tax liens that would have been 
before the trial court was a title report, prepared by the BRANDLEY's brother, which the 
parties had already stipulated was in error. Based on the foregoing, this Court cannot 
consider any evidence in regards to the alleged tax liens, and even if the Court were to do 
so, BRANDLEY has never produced any evidence other than an erroneous title report to 
support their existence. 
VI. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT SUPPORT ANY OF THE ISSUES SET FORTH BY BRANDLEY 
IN HIS BRIEF. 
As already set forth herein, each of the issues set forth by BRANDLEY in his 
Brief were not preserved on appeal and should not be considered by this Court. If, 
however, this Court determines that it should review each of the issues set forth by 
BRANDLEY in his appeal, SEAMONS addresses each issue as follows: 
a. The trial court judge did not enter new evidence. 
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The first issue raised by BRANDLEY in his Brief is the assertion that the trial 
court judge introduced new evidence depriving BRANDLEY of his "right of discovery 
and due process." This argument is without basis in law or in fact. "An elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
BRANDLEY appeared at the proceeding before the trial court represented by 
counsel, was allowed to produce evidence, including his own personal testimony, and 
was afforded the opportunity to present his objections. 
BRANDLEY specifically states that his due process was violated when the trial 
court judge allegedly introduced new evidence by making reference to the quit claim 
deed that was purported to convey the open space parcel to BRANDLEY. While not 
specifically spelled out as such, BRANDLEY would have to argue that he had no notice 
of the quit claim deed and thus had no opportunity to present and objection thereto or 
otherwise address the quit claim deed. Again, BRANDLEY is disingenuous in making 
such an argument. The Petition filed by SEAMONS with the trial court and served on 
BRANDLEY, identifies the quit claim deed. (See Petition to Nullify Lien ffijlO, 12, 16). 
Also, BRANDLEYs very own motion to dismiss the petition that was filed with the trial 
court identified the quit claim deed. (See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Petition to Nullify Lien for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which 
Relief Can be Granted ^ 5, 7, 8). SEAMONS addressed the issue again in their Reply 
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i 
Memorandum to the Motion to Dismiss, which was also filed with the trial court and 
served on BRANDLEY, wherein SEAMONS argued; 
"it is important to note that SEAMONS made no warranties to 
BRANDLEY, as the parcel was conveyed by way of a quit 
claim deed." (See Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Petition to Nullify Lien pg. 
6). 
During the hearing in the trial court, BRANDLEY was asked to review and address the 
quit claim deed during his testimony. (R. at 30:2-22). The quit claim deed was 
subsequently entered as evidence. Id. It is difficult to believe that BRANDLEY would 
now argue that the quit claim deed was "new evidence" entered by the trial court judge 
and that BRANDLEY had no opportunity to present any objections to the quit claim 
deed. The quit claim deed is at the very center of the issue that brought the parties before 
the trial court. BRANDLEY, in his brief, even goes into great detail to explain why he 
and his counsel decided to negotiate for a quit claim deed as opposed to a warranty deed. 
(See Appellant's Brief page 12). BRANDLEY's "right of discovery and due process" 
were in no way violated by the judge stating the legal definition of a quit claim deed. 
Such a finding by the trial court is therefore adequately supported by the record and this 
Court must affirm the trial court's ruling. 
b. There is no evidence that the judge ignored "pertinent facts". 
As set forth above, the record adequately supports the trial court's ultimate 
decision that the lien was wrongful at the time it was filed. BRANDLEY seems to argue 
that because the trial court did not rule in his favor it could only have been because the 
Judge only considered facts unfavorable to BRANDLEY and favorable to SEAMONS. 
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BRANDLEY cites to the case law that was presented before the trial court, Eldridge v. 
Farnsworth, 166 P.3d 69, 654 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), setting forth the law that the court 
must evaluate the lien at the time the lien is filed. There is no indication, however, that 
the trial court failed to evaluate the lien filed by BRANDLEY at the time it was filed. In 
fact, there is no indication from the record that either party attempted to argue anything to 
the contrary. There is certainly no indication that the trial court made its decision "from 
[its] personally presented information while at the same time discarding the main factual 
evidence," as BRANDLEY contends. 
As set forth above, the Court evaluated the encumbrances and other issues that 
were raised by the parties; whether the open space parcel had been previously conveyed 
to the City of Wellsville, and whether the Notice of Subdivision Ordinance Violation 
and/or the judgment were encumbrances on the parcel at the time the lien was filed. In 
fact, counsel for SEAMONS specifically argued that the encumbrances did not exist at 
the time the lien was filed. (R. at 40:2-3). Further, BRANDLEY also raised the same 
case law in closing argument. (R. at 44:6-7). The Notice of Lien that gave rise to this 
action was filed on August 4, 2010. BRANDLEY had the title report prepared on June 
28, 2010. Therefore, at the time the lien was filed, BRANDLEY was relying on the title 
report. There is no evidence that either party or the trial court evaluated the lien at any 
time other than when it was filed. 
The other issue raised by BRANDLEY before this court and the trial court was 
whether or not the PARCEL had been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. The trial court 
stated that there was no evidence of conveyance to the City of Wellsville, nor was there 
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any statute that required conveyance to the City. The hearing was held on October 14, 
2010, over two months after the lien was filed, and there was still no evidence that the 
parcel had been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. If there was no indication that the 
parcel had been conveyed to the City of Wellsville at any point prior to October 14, 2010, 
then there certainly wouldn't be any evidence of such at the time that the line was filed. 
There is nothing to indicate that the court considered evidence of any occurrence that 
took place subsequent to the filing of the lien. 
The other contention raised by BRANDLEY under this issue is that the judge's 
decision was influenced by an "Ad Hominem Fallacy (sic.)." BRANDLEY cites to the 
record wherein the judge stated; 
"That's up to him to file a lawsuit against his brother, I 
suppose, but that -just beceiuse he has a false report is not 
grounds to set aside or justify the filing of the lien." (R. at 
49). 
It is apparent from the record that BRANDLEY's Brief has taken this portion of the trial 
court's decision out of context. The sentence immediately preceding that cited by 
BRANDLEY stated, "I appreciate the fact that he relied on [the title report]." (R. at 
49:11-12). The judge was indicating that BRANDLEY had an obligation, pursuant to the 
Mediation Agreement and Settlement Agreement, to determine whether or not there were 
encumbrances on the open space parcel. The judge empathized with the BRANDLEY 
for his reliance on the erroneous title report. The judge was merely opining as to 
BRANDLEY's potential remedy of filing suit against the title preparer, which in this case 
happened to be BRANDLEY's brother. While the fact that it was BRANDLEY's brother 
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who prepared the faulty title report is somewhat suspicious, there is no indication from 
the record that this had any influence on the judge's decision. 
Even if the judge did consider the evidence of the relationship between 
BRANDLEY and the individual who may have prepared the title report, it was relevant 
evidence and no objection was ever made by BRANDLEY as to its introduction. There 
is no indication in the record that BRANDLEY preserved such an issue for appeal. As a 
result, of the foregoing, the Court should not consider this issue as raised by 
BRANDLEY. 
c. The trial court judge did not act as a witness. 
This issue, as raised by BRANDLEY, goes hand in hand with the prior argument 
in regard to the judge introducing new evidence. It appears that BRANDLEY claims that 
because the judge stated the legal definition and effects of a quit claim deed, he became a 
"material witness" to the case. As was discussed above, the quit claim deed was not 
presented to the trial court by the judge. Both parties presented the quit claim deed to 
the trial court. To contend that the judge is a witness because he acknowledged evidence 
of a quit claim deed that was referenced to by both parties in their moving papers and 
entered into evidence is quite ludicrous. 
BRANDLEY brings the issue, merely because he did not like the trial court's 
ruling. The very role of the judiciary is to interpret the law. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 
P.2d 844, 859 (Utah 1994). After being presented with the evidence in regards to the 
execution of the quit claim deed, the trial court merely set forth the definition and/or legal 
effects of a quit claim deed. Utah Code Annotated §57-1-3 states; 
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"A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and 
estate of the grantor in and to the premises therein described 
and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging, at the date of the conveyance.5' 
The trial court judge merely interpreted the law in regards to the effect of a quitclaim 
deed to the facts presented by the parties. BRANDLEY only contends that the trial court 
was wrong to introduce this explanation of the legal effect of the quit claim deed, he 
makes no indication that he disagrees with the Court's interpretation of the law. The very 
reason why the parties sought intervention of the Court was to determine the application 
of the laws to the circumstances in which the parties were involved, which is exactly 
what the trial court judge did. Because the judge did not act as a witness, but merely 
performed the very role assigned to him, this court must affirm the trial court's ruling. 
d. The court may rule in cases where it finds ambiguity in a 
contract. 
BRANDLEY mistakenly asserts in his brief that a court cannot rule for any party 
involved in a dispute over a contract that the Court finds ambiguous. As this Court is 
certainly aware, BRANDLEY has mischairacterized and misunderstood the case law cited 
in his brief. BRANDLEY cites the case Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 
1983) and other similar cases to support his contention that a court cannot rule for any 
party if they find a contract to be ambiguous. (Appellant's Brief pg. 19). BRANDLEY 
misunderstands the context of the cases that he cites.1 The Faulkner court ultimately 
1
 In Faulkner, the parties to a contract had each brought respective motions for summary judgment in regards to then-
respective duties under a contract. Faulkner at 1293. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment and denied that of the defendant. Id. On the appeal the defendants argued that the two determinative 
provisions in the subject contract were not ambiguous and that the intention of the parties was plain from the 
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determined that the language in the two contract provisions in question raised "enough of 
an ambiguity as to the intent of the parties that the case [could] not be decided as a matter 
of law for the plaintiffs/5 and ultimately concluded that the contract was ambiguous and 
could not be resolved in plaintiffs favor as a matter of law. Id. at 1294. In reaching its 
conclusion, the court relied on the well settled law that a "motion for summary judgment 
may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the 
contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended." Id. At 1293. 
The court in Faulkner obviously was not setting forth the proposition that a court 
cannot rule for either side if it finds that the contract is ambiguous as BRANDLEY 
asserts. The Court was merely stating that as a matter of law it couldn't make a 
determination when evidence of an ambiguity exists, but that such would be left for a 
trier of fact to determine the intentions of the parties. 
"Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law." Saleh v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, TJ14, 133 P.3d 428. It is, however, left to a trier of fact to 
determine the intention of the parties. Contrary to BRANDLEYs assertions, it is very 
much up to the trier of fact to interpret ambiguities in a contract, and "rule for either 
side." The goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the contracting parties' 
intentions at the time the contract was made. See WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity 
Sew. Corp., 2002 UT 88,117, 54 P.3d 1139. Thus, [u]nder well-accepted rules of 
language of the contract. Id. The Faulkner court addressed the issue of extraneous or parol evidence, explaining 
that parol evidence is admissible to explain the intentions of the parties when the contract itself is ambiguous. Id. 
The Court went on to explain that; "whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided before parol 
evidence may be admitted." Id. (citing Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199 
(Utah 1983)). 
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contract interpretation, the court is to [begin its analysis by] look[ing] to the language of 
the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. A court 
must also "consider each contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 
LLC, 2009 UT 27, \ 25, 207 P.3d 1235 (omission in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50,117, 84 P.3d 1134). If after looking at the 
plain language, the court determines that the language is ambiguous, the parties1 intent is 
a question of fact and extrinsic evidence regarding their intentions may be considered. 
See City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ^ f 31, 233 
P.3d 461. There is no case law, statute or otherwise that supports BRANDLEYs 
contention in this regard and therefore, the Court must disregard BRANDLEY's 
contention that the trial court's ruling was "prejudicial" to BRANDLEY. 
e. There was no evidence presented of a typing error in the title 
report. 
BRANDLEY combines several sub-issues into what he has labeled "E ISSUE." 
BRANDLEY's basic premise in this regard seems to be that the title report contained, 
what he characterizes to be, a "typing error," in the input of the judgment amount on the 
title report. As set forth above, there was never any evidence presented to the trial court 
that this was the result of a simple "typing error." 
It was stipulated to by both parties that the title report was in error in regards to the 
judgment amount. BRANDLEY's brief is untruthful in indicating that the; "Judge in his 
decision acknowledged that Appelant (sic.) did not stipulate to it the (Judgment) (sic.)." 
38 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(See BRANDLEY's Brief pf. 20). This assertion made by BRANDLEY is absolutely 
false. The trial court, acknowledged that both parties did stipulate to the error in the title 
report. The record, accurately stated, sets forth; 
"The title report was in error. I think both of you agreed to 
that. Well, I don't think that, you stipulated to it, that there 
was no valid encumbrance because of the judgment. That 
judgment had been satisfied." (R. at 48:24-49:2). 
The record is clear that both parties not only agreed that the title report was in error in 
regards to the judgment amount and to the fact that the judgment had been satisfied. This 
is also made evident by the fact that there was no argument from BRANDLEY that the 
title report was accurate. 
BRANDLEY cannot now argue that because the release of lien and satisfaction of 
judgment was not filed with the Fourth District Court, that the JUDGMENT still 
constitutes an encumbrance. Even despite the stipulation, the Release of Notice of Lien 
and Satisfaction of Judgment was filed with the Cache County Recorder's Office and 
appeared on the abstract of title, evidence of such was introduced as evidence in the trial 
court. (See Appellant's Brief Exhibit G). The fact that it wasn't filed with the Fourth 
District Court is irrelevant. Because there is nothing on the record to indicate that there 
this was mere typing error, or that if it was typing error the trial court's decision would 
have been different, this Court must affirm the trial court's findings. 
f. The trial court correctly determined that the mediation 
agreement was drafted by Brandley's Counsel. 
BRANDLEY also contends that the trial court erred when the judge stated; "I also 
find the mediation agreement was drafted by defendant's counsel." BRANDLEY failed 
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to preserve this issue on appeal as there was no objection made by BRANDLEY. 
Further, it is set forth in the Court's order that was approved as to form by 
BRANDLEY5s counsel with no objection. (See Trial Court's Order f 1). As a result, 
this issue should not be addressed by this Court. 
In addition, BRANDLEY cites language from the Release and Settlement 
Agreement, which pertains only to the Release and Settlement Agreement in support of 
his this contention. The provision in the Release and Settlement Agreement that states 
that each party participated materially in the preparation of that document is irrelevant to 
the Mediation Agreement, as the Release and Settlement Agreement was executed nearly 
a month subsequent to the Mediation Agreement. The record adequately supports the 
trial court's determination. Further, this court cannot overturn the trial court's ruling 
based on this issue now raised, for the first time, by BRANDLEY. 
g. The trial court correctly determined that the open space 
designation had nothing to do with the agreements between the 
parties. 
SEAMONS is confused as to the nature of the issue BRANDLEY attempts to set 
forth in his issue labeled "G ISSUE." To the best of SEAMONS' ability to discern the 
issue set forth by BRANDLEY, SEAMONS believes BRANDLEY is arguing that the 
open space designation had something to do with the agreement between the parties and 
that the trial court erred by finding otherwise. The trial court was quite clear in its 
explanation of its understanding of the agreements between the parties, the court stated as 
follows: 
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"and the agreement was, as I read the agreement, the 
agreement was is that a quit claim deed would be executed. It 
would be held for 30 days. It would be up to the defendant in 
this case to determine whether or not there were any 
encumbrances on the property, but the open space would not 
be an encumbrance." (R. at 48:14-19). 
The parties, in both of the agreements, had agreed that the open space designation would 
not constitute an encumbrance, effectively taking the open space designation out of 
consideration and making "open space" irrelevant to their agreement. The only 
contingencies were whether the parcel had already been conveyed to the City of 
Wellsville or whether it had been encumbered in any way, other than the open space 
designation. Both parties already acknowledged that the parcel was designated as open 
space, therefore, it had nothing to do with the agreement and was not at issue before the 
court. It is unclear why BRANDLEY contends that the judge was in error in stating as 
much. 
The only way the open space would have been relevant to the agreement between 
the parties would have been if BRANDLEY was unaware of such a designation. Because 
BRANDLEY was aware of the open space designation and agreed it wouldn't constitute 
an encumbrance, it effectively had nothing to do with the parties' agreement. As a result, 
the trial court did not error in making such a determination. 
h. Seamons had not contracted with the City of Wellsville to convey 
the open space parcel to the City of Wellsville at the time the lien 
was filed. 
BRANDLEY's final issue in his brief is also somewhat unclear. To the best of 
SEAMONS' understanding, it appears as though BRANDLEY is attempting to assert that 
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he produced evidence to the trial court that SEAMONS had contracted with the City of 
Wellsville to convey the open space parcel to them. BRANDLEY, in his brief, states that 
"[i]t was pointed out to the court at least 10 times (sic.) in the hearing that Seamons had 
signed a contract with the city." BRANDLEY makes several citations to the record to 
support the assertion. Each of the citations to the record referred to by BRANDLEY is a 
reference or assertion made by BRANDLEY during his testimony of an alleged contract 
between SEAMONS and the City of Wellsvile. There was no such contract entered into 
evidence at the trial court and the trial court found that there was no such agreement. (R. 
at 48:9-21). The trial court received the testimony of BRANDLEY as evidence and 
obviously chose not to give it much weight, as it lacked any substance other than 
BRANDLEY stating his interpretation of a nonexistent contract. 
To support his contention, BRANDLEY cites a small portion of Wellsville City 
Ordinance Section 16.20.040(C)(2)(a). BRANDLEY, however, fails to cite the 
ordinance in its entirety. Wellsville City Ordinance Section 16.20.040 requires that 
applicants for the development of any land within Wellsville City set aside a minimum 
percentage of sensitive land to be designated as open space. In 16.20.040(C)(1) it states; 
"Different ownership and management options apply to the 
permanently protected open space created through the 
planned residential subdivision process. The open space of 
sensitive lands or potentially sensitive lands shall remain 
undivided and may be owned and managed by a 
homeowner's association, the city, or a recognized land trust 
or conservancy. A public land dedication, not exceeding ten 
percent of the total parcel size, may be required by the city 
through the sensitive lands to facilitate trail connections. A 
narrative describing ownership, use and maintenance 
responsibilities shall be submitted for all common and public 
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improvements, utilities, and open space within undivided 
lands." 
The ordinance makes it clear that the designated open space may be owned by entities 
other than the City of Wellsville. BRANDLEY misleadingly cites only to a portion of 
Subsection (C)(2)(a), wherein it states; "The City shall have first and last offer of 
undivided lands in the event such land is to be conveyed." (See BRANDLEY's Brief 
page 23). What BRANDLEY fails to cite is the preceding provision wherein it states; 
"Undivided lands within a development shall be owned, 
administered and maintained by any of the following methods, 
either individually or in combination, and subject to approval 
by the city:" 
The ordinance then goes on to provide options for the ownership, administration and 
maintenance for potential open space. In subsection (C)(2)(a), it states; 
"The city shall have the first and last offer of dedication of 
undivided lands in the event such land is to be conveyed. 
Dedication shall take the form of a fee simple ownership. 
The city may, but shall not be required to accept undivided 
land." 
The ordinance puts the burden on the City of Wellsville to make the first and last offer of 
dedication on any open space parcel. It is not up to BRANDLEY to make sure that such 
an offer takes place. Further, this issue was never raised in the trial court and no 
evidence was ever produced to demonstrate that SEAMONS had not made a first and last 
offer to the City of Wellsville. Because the issue was not raised in the trial court, 
SEAMONS will not attempt to do so here. 
BRANDLEY then goes on to state in his brief; "[w]e will respond in this issue as 
if the conveyance is going to the City." SEAMONS is confused by this statement and is 
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unsure why BRANDLEY would assume that the "conveyance is going to the City." 
Nothing was ever conveyed to the City of Wellsville, there was no evidence presented to 
the trial court that the parcel was ever conveyed to the City of Wellsville, and there was 
no contract to convey the parcel to the City of Wellsville. The ordinance does not require 
the parcel be conveyed to the City of Wellsville, it clearly states that open space may be 
owned and managed by a homeowner's association, the city, or a recognized land trust 
or conservancy. (See Wellsville City Ordinance 16.20.040(C)(1)). Therefore, there was 
no requirement, as BRANDLEY contends, to convey it to the City. Even the one 
sentence from the ordinance that BRANDLEY bothered to cite shows that there was no 
requirement to convey the parcel to the City, that language discusses offering the parcel 
to the City. 
BRANDLEY5 s Brief goes on to state; "[b]y signing said contract SEAMONS 
were responsible for its contents," and that "said contract is an encumbrance as noticed 
by the City on the property title with the county recorders(sic) office." (See 
BRANDLEYs Brief page 23). BRANDLEY never references any contract between the 
City and SEAMONS and no contract was ever presented to the trial court. BRANDLEY 
even goes on to assert that this unknown contract is an executory contract. BRANDLEY 
does not cite any provision from the alleged contract to support his conclusion that the 
contract is executory in nature, but he intimates that the contract created some duty on the 
part of SEAMONS to perform some future transfer of title. 
SEAMONS never agreed to transfer the title to the City at any future point. The 
Wellsville City Ordinance cited herein is evidence of such. The ordinance provides the 
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developer three different options of what to do with open space, but it does not indicate 
that a developer must agree to convey the parcel to the City. 
Apellant then proceeds to argue in his brief that SEAMONS "knew of the 
requirements of the City ordinances and they are accountable for the contract they 
signed." BRANDLEY then states that he "believe[s] it was with Malice of 
forethought(sic) that [SEAMONS] offer(sic) to convey the property to [BRANDLEY] 
for settlement." Again, this argument is an extremely disingenuous one for BRANDLEY 
to make considering that during the hearing in the trial court he made the following 
statement; "I knew it was open space just as well as Seamons knew it was open space." 
(R. at 9:16-18). As set forth above, BRANDLEY worked with the City from the very 
inception of the development process in regards to setting aside the open space and 
designating the PARCEL as such. Evidence was also produced in the form of 
BRANDLEY5 s deposition testimony wherein, BRANDLEY had stated that he was in 
charge of getting city approvals and hiring contractors. (See Exhibit ' C to Petition to 
Nullify Lien, Deposition transcript pg. 43). BRANDLEY also indicated that he had 
served as "chairman of planning and zoning," and that he had "met with lots of 
cities... [and he] enjoy [ed] going to the city meetings and doing work on the subdivision," 
and that he "enjoyed doing layouts with the engineers." (See Exhibit ' C to Petition to 
Nullify Lien, Deposition transcript pg. 44). He went on to say; "that's something that I 
do, and I do it on our other projects" Id. BRANDLEY then proclaimed that he attended 
"all the planning and zoning city council meetings for the approval process," and that 
Appelles did not attend any of those meetings until 2004. Id. 
45 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the hearing in front of the trial court, BRANDLEY argued that he was aware of 
the restrictions that accompanied the open space, but that he never took the time to look 
at the specific language of the ordinance. (R. at 13:3-7). SEAMONS finds it odd that 
BRANDLEY, as the self-proclaimed manager of the development, failed to explore the 
restrictions that accompanied the open space designation. BRANDLEY knew very well 
what he had agreed to in the Mediation Agreement. In fact, he would have had a better 
understanding as to the status of the open space parcel than SEAMONS had at that time. 
Even assuming BRANDLEY was unaware of the exact nature of the restrictions, as set 
forth above, Utah law charges BRANDLEY with notice of public statutes and 
ordinances. 
BRANDLEY then states in his Brief that SEAMONS "added to the agreement the 
clause that the designation of open space was not an encumbrance hoping some how to 
hide the fact they knew they had signed any(sic) agreement giving conveyance to the 
City" (SeeBRANDLEYsBriefatpage26). BRANDLEY appears to argue that 
SEAMONS somehow slipped that language into the Mediation unbeknownst to 
BRANDLEY. The trial court found, without objections, that BRANDLEY's counsel 
drafted the Mediation Agreement. 
There was no intention on the part of SEAMONS to be deceptive in the inclusion 
of that clause into the agreement. The purpose of the inclusion of this clause into the 
agreement is obvious; SEAMONS knew that the open space would be considered an 
encumbrance and that they couldn't fulfill their duties under the agreement without the 
inclusion of such a provision. 
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It was BRANDLEY who proposed the inclusion of the provision in the 
agreements allowing him 30 days to verify that the open space parcel had not already 
been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. It would seem odd that BRANDLEY would 
request inclusion of this language absent an understanding of the open space ordinance. 
If indeed BRANDLEY believed that the only restriction that accompanied an open space 
designation was that the land could not be developed, it would seem odd that he would 
request the inclusion of this provision. The only explanations for the inclusion of that 
provision is that either BRANDLEY already had an understanding of the restrictions or 
those restrictions were discussed openly at the mediation. Either way, BRANDLEY 
cannot argue that he was unaware of the open space restrictions prior to executing the 
Mediation Agreement. Further, BRANDLEY had counsel present at the mediation and 
had the ability to research any potential restrictions that may have accompanied the open 
space designation. This is precisely why SEAMONS only agreed to convey the parcel by 
way of a quit claim deed. 
It is clear that the City had no intentions of requiring SEAMONS to transfer the 
open space parcel to the City. That is made evident in the minutes from the Wellsville 
City Council meeting from July 21, 2010, a meeting attended by BRANDLEY, wherein a 
motion was made by the City Council to discuss the open space parcel with the City 
Attorney "and have a filing done on the property." The city council further indicated that 
"the City will not allow any development in the open space." (See Exhibit H as attached 
to Appellant's Brief). Nowhere in the minutes from that meeting does anyone from the 
City of Wellsville indicate that the open space parcel is owned by the City. In fact, it is 
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obvious that the City acknowledges that it doesn't have ownership because the council 
made a motion to have a filing done on the property. Id. There would be no reason for 
the City of Wellsville to make a motion to request their attorney to "have a filing done" 
on property that they believed they already owned. It appears evident that the City was 
concerned only with not allowing development to take place and advising any and all 
prospective purchasers and/or transferees of that fact. No evidence has ever been 
produced that the City of Wellsville has requested that PARCEL be conveyed to them. 
Shortly after that City Council Meeting, Wellsville City filed a Notice of 
Subdivision Ordinance Violation. This Subdivision Ordinance Violation does not 
constitute a contract between SEAMONS and the City of Wellsville to convey the open 
space parcel. It is evident from reviewing that Notice that its intent was only to provide 
notice to subsequent purchasers or transferees of the property of the open space 
ordinance. As set forth above, the City of Wellsville indicates in the very first paragraph 
that SEAMONS are the owners of the open space parcel. (See Appellant's Brief-
Exhibit E). Even subsequent to the Mediation Agreement the City of Wellsville is 
acknowledges that SEAMONS own the open space parcel. Absent from that Notice is an 
assertion from the City that the parcel must be conveyed to the City itself. The City only 
states, in its Notice, that it can require that title be transferred in accordance with the open 
space ordinance requirements. As discussed above, that ordinance allows transfer to 
entities other than the City of Wellsville. As a result, BRANDLEY's contention that 
there was some "executory contract" wherein SEAMONS agreed to convey the parcel to 
the City of Wellsville is unfounded. 
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i. There was no evidence of fraud presented to the trial court. 
Apellant also makes a brief attempt to accuse SEAMONS of fraud. The Court 
should disregard this argument as this issue was never raised in the trial court. There was 
no evidence presented before the trial court that would support a contention that 
SEAMONS acted fraudulently. Even should the court feel inclined to visit this issue, 
there is no indication of any facts set forth in the trial court to support BRANDLEY5 s 
allegation of fraud. 
There were no false representations made by SEAMONS. The status of the 
property as open space was openly discussed at mediation. BRANDLEY himself 
acknowledged that he was aware of the open space designation. BRANDLEY was the 
manager of the development process and was responsible for meeting with the City to 
resolve issues such as the open space requirement. There are no facts whatsoever, to 
indicate that SEAMONS were anything but truthful in their representations in regards to 
the property. Both parties were well aware of the agreement that they were making. 
Further, SEAMONS made no representations or warranties in regards to the 
PARCEL as they conveyed the parcel by way of a quit claim deed. "A quitclaim deed 
conveys whatever interest the grantors possess at the time," United States v. Wooten, 40 
F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir.1930). By definition there can be no false representations when a 
parcel is conveyed by way of a quitclaim deed. As stated by the trial court, SEAMONS 
had simply agreed to release whatever interest, if any, they had in the property to 
BRANDLEY. 
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BRANDLEY goes on to argue that he received "no value" from either property 
offered in the settlement. This simply is not true, while admittedly the parcel does not 
have the value that may be expected for 35 acres of land, there is some value in the land. 
BRANDLEY testified that they have always been able to farm the land, and perform 
other activities. (R. at 10:21-23 ). The City of Wellsville's only stated concern is that no 
development takes place on the parcel. In addition, the City of Wellsville has agreed to 
purchase the parcel from BRANDLEY for value. As a result of the foregoing, the Court 
cannot visit this issue as no evidence of fraud was ever presented to the trial court and 
even so, no determination could have been made by the trial court in regards to fraud on a 
petition to nullify a lien. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly granted SEAMONS' Petition to Nullify Lien. 
BRANDLEY has filed a Brief that presents new evidence before this Court, fails to 
adhere to the requirements set forth in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
and raises issues that were not raised in the trial court. Finally, the District Court was 
correct in its determination that the lien filed by BRANDLEY was wrongful at the time it 
was filed. As a result, this Court must affirm the District Court's final judgment. 
Dated: July 3, 2011 E M C S O N ^ J S H A W r K ^ 
Phillip RTSEaw 
Attorney for Appellees 
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case, and that's, I guess, what somebody will need to 
determine. First of all, in an accurate title report. 
Second of all, a document that was drafted which should have 
reflected an agreement between the parties, which the Court 
finds somewhat ambiguous. But I also find the mediation 
agreement was drafted by defendant's counsel, and, therefore, 
will be held as per case law, that it will be interpreted in 
a manner against his interest. 
First of all, there's a fallacy, in my 
understanding of the law there's - it would be the fallacy in 
your arguments that the - and, in deed, the document seems to 
indicate that it would be conveyed, but a quit claim deed 
doesn't convey anything. A quit claim deed releases whatever 
interest the person signing that quit claim deed has in the 
parcel of ground. You may argue, Well, yeah, we took title 
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by a quit claim deed, but all you did was you received 
whatever title that individual who signed it has. If he 
doesn't have any title, you don't get any title. That's why 
it's a quit claim deed. You quit claim the property, and you 
give it somebody else. Whatever interest you have in it, you 
give it to somebody else. If you convey title by warranty 
deed, it's a different deal. You warranty that that person 
receives title. 
Now, there's been no argument here, although Mr. 
Brandley argues that, well, his understanding was that the 
city already had title. No, that's not the law unless 
somebody can convince me otherwise. There's no statute that 
says that the city obtains title to that property. It has to 
be deeded to them, and the agreement was - as I read the 
agreement, the agreement was is that a quit claim deed would 
be executed. It would be held for 30 days. It would be up 
to the defendant in this case to determine whether or not 
there were any encumbrances on the property, but the open 
space would not be an encumbrance. So the Court totally 
disregards your argument that open space had anything to do 
with your agreement. 
The question is whether or not that that title 
report that was submitted gave him cause to file the lien. 
The title report was in error. I think both of you agreed to 
that. Well, I don't think that, you stipulated to it, that 
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there was no valid encumbrance because of a judgment. That 
judgment had been satisfied. 
So the question is in your terminology which is 
drafted by the defendant's counsel. It says that the -
"Creekside agrees that it will have no more than 30 days from 
the date of the execution of the quit claim deed to determine 
that parcel has not been conveyed to the city of Wellsville," 
and again this Court doesn't see that it's whatever the 
defendant thinks, it's his obligation to determine whether or 
not that there is an encumbrance against that property, and a 
false title report is not a determination. I appreciate the 
fact that he relied on it. That's up to him to file a 
lawsuit against his brother, I suppose, but that - just 
because he has a false report is not grounds to set aside -
or to justify the filing of the lien. The Court will grant 
the petition to nullify the lien. And in preparing the same, 
will you prepare the findings and conclusions the Court has 
enunciated, Mr. Shaw? Very well, we've got some -
•MR. SHAW: Your Honor, we'd like a moment to ask 
the Court for attorneys fees. I believe the Court - I 
believe the statute requires that in the order attorneys fees 
and costs be awarded to the petitioner. It says in the code. 
It says that attorneys fees -
THE COURT: I think it says it shall. 
MR. SHAW: It shall. 
49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE COURT: It's mandatory. Prepare an affidavit 
and submit that along with your order, Mr. Shaw. 
Anything else by way of clarification from either 
side? 
MR. HANSEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. So prepare that and submit 
it to the Court. 
MR. SHAW: Thank you. 
• MR. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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Phillip R. Shaw (#12383) 
ERICSON & SHAW, LLP 
88 West Center Street 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-4775 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERWIN SEAMONS; JANE 
SEAMONS 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
STEPHEN L. BRANDLEY; CREEKSIDE 
LAND DEVELOPMENT, LLC; and 
JOHNDOE1TO10 
Respondants, 
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S 
PETITON TO NULLIFY LIEN AND 
DENYING RESPONDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CIVIL NO: 100102607 
JUDGE: Judkins 
THE ABOVE MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Petitioners' Petition to 
Nullify Lien and Respondants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, 
including the parties' respective memoranda, each document submitted, oral arguments, the 
testimony of Respondent Stephen L. Brandley and the applicable case law and statutory 
provisions, and giving due consideration to the matter, grants Petitioners' Petition to Nullify Lien 
and finds as follows: 
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1. The Mediation Agreement that was previously entered into between the parties to 
his action was drafted by counsel for Respondants STEPHEN L. BRANDLEY and CREEKSIDE 
LAND DEVLEPMENT, LLC. and should therefore be interpreted against their interest. 
2. The title report prepared by Bonneville Superior Title, identified by Commitment 
Number 150560, Effective Date June 28,2010, and submitted as Exhibit 1 to Respondants' 
Motion to Dismiss Petition to Nullify Lien in the above-entitled action (hereinafter referred to as 
"TITLE REPORT") was in error. 
3. The Judgment identified in Paragraph 25 of Schedule B Section 2 of TITLE 
REPORT did not constitute an encumbrance to the 35 acre land designated as open space 
situated in Wellsville, UT, identified as parcel number 10-076-0000 (hereinafter referred to as 
"OPEN SPACE"). 
4. The OPEN SPACE had not been conveyed to the City of Wellsville. 
5. Petitioners SHERWIN SEAMONS and JANE SEAMONS conveyed the OPEN 
SPACE to Respondants by quit claim deed and therefore released only the property interest that 
SHERWIN SEAMONS and JANE SEAMONS possessed at the time of conveyance. 
6. On August 12,2010, Respondants STEPHEN L. BRANDLEY and CREEKSIDE 
LAND DEVELOPMENT, LLC filed a Notice of Lien in the amount of $50,000 with the Cache 
County Recorder identified as Entry No. 1026738 against parcel number 11-020-0002, more 
specifically identified as: 
BEG AT PT 121.84 RDS N OF SW COR SEC 8 T UN R 1W 7 E 80 
RDS TO A PT 122 RDS N OF S BNDRY LN OF SD SEC 8 TH N 6.8 
CHS SW'LY 80 RDS TO A PT 5.54 CHS DUE N OF BEG S 5.54 CHS 
TO POB CONT 11 AC ALSO: BEG AT A PT 80 RDS N OF SW COR 
OF SEC 8 T UN R 1W & TH E 520 FT M/L TO INTERSECTION 
WITH THE CL OF SORENSON SPRING DRAINAGE TH NE'LY ALG 
CL OF SD DRAINAGE & TH CL OF BIRD CNAYON CREEK TO A 
PT WHICH IS N 272 FT & W 262.23 FT FROM SE COR OF THE NW/4 
OF THE SW/4 SD SEC 8 SD PT ALSO THE SW COR LOT BLK 26 
PLAT A MENDON CITY SVY & TH 00*28'51" E 71 FT TH E 262.23 
FT TO N-S FENCE LN TH N 350.45 FT TH W 80 RDS TH S 10.46 CHS 
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TO POB CONT 17.40 AC CONT 28.4 AC IN ALL 
7. The Notice of Lien identified in Paragraph 6 is WRONGFUL and is VOID AB 
INITIO. 
THE COURT DOES HEREBY ORDER: 
1. That any and all real property that is or may be encumbered in any way by the 
Notice of Lien filed by STEPHEN L. BRANDLEY and CREEKSIDE LAND DEVELOPMENT 
in the amount of $50,000 with the Cache County Recorder identified as Entry No. 1026738 
against parcel number 11-020-0002, more specifically identified as: 
BEG AT PT 121.84 RDS N OF SW COR SEC 8 T UN R 1W 7 E 80 
RDS TO A PT 122 RDS N OF S BNDRY LN OF SD SEC 8 TH N 6.8 
CHS SW'LY 80 RDS TO A PT 5.54 CHS DUE N OF BEG S 5.54 CHS 
TO POB CONT 11 AC ALSO: BEG AT A PT 80 RDS N OF SW COR 
OF SEC 8 T UN R 1W & TH E 520 FT M/L TO INTERSECTION 
WITH THE CL OF SORENSON SPRING DRAINAGE TH NE'LY ALG 
CL OF SD DRAINAGE & TH CL OF BIRD CNAYON CREEK TO A 
PT WHICH IS N 272 FT & W 262.23 FT FROM SE COR OF THE NW/4 
OF THE SW/4 SD SEC 8 SD PT ALSO THE SW COR LOT BLK 26 
PLAT A MENDON CITY SVY & TH 00*28'51" E 71 FT TH E 262.23 
FT TO N-S FENCE LN TH N 350.45 FT TH W 80 RDS TH S 10.46 CHS 
TO POB CONT 17.40 AC CONT 28.4 AC IN ALL 
is to be released thereof. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7, Respondents STEPHEN L. 
BRANDLEY and CREEKSIDE LAND DEVELOPMENT are hereby ordered to reimburse 
Petitioners for all attorney's fees and costs incurred by Petitioner's as a result of the filing of the 
Petition to Nullify Lien in the amount of $4,219.00 as set forth in the Petitioner's Affidavit of 
Costs. 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that Petitioners' Petition to Nullify Lien is GRANTED and Defendants' Motion to 
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Dismiss is DENIED. 
DATED this ZH_ day of <KW 
DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Jfytf,^. 
RSChristian Hansen' 
Attorney for Respondants 
1, CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY 
OF THE ORIGINAL FILED IN FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS. 
DATE. WmjJQ-
DEPUTY CI 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29 day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITON TO NULLIFY LIEN AND DENYING 
RESPONDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS was sent via U.S. Mail to the following: 
Brian G. Cannell 
R. Christian Hansen 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C. 
595 South Riverwoods Pkwy., Suite 100 
Logan, UT 84321 
(435)752-2610 
(435)753-8895 (Facsimile) 
; Y r t + J L ^ xJ^CLAJJpCUiJ^-' 
Legal Assistant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5 day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEES was sent via U.S. Mail to the following: 
Stephen L. Brandley 
2546 South 5900 West 
Mendon, UT 84325 
Legal 
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